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Abstract We develop a framework that allows us to emulate standard
results from the “agreeing to disagree” literature with generalised decision
functions (e.g. Bacharach (1985)) in a manner the avoids known incoher-
ences pointed out by Moses and Nachum (1990). Avoiding the incoherences
requires making some sacrifices: For example, we must require the decision
functions to be independent of interactive information, and, the language
in which the states are described must be “rich” - in some well-defined
sense. Using weak additional assumptions, we also extend all previous
results to allow agents to base their decisions on possibly false information.
Finally, we provide agreement theorems in which the decision functions are
not required to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle (a central assumption in
the standard results).
Keywords Agreeing to disagree, knowledge, common knowledge, belief,
information, epistemic logic.
JEL classification D80, D83, D89.
1 Introduction
The agreement theorem of Aumann (1976) states that if agents have a common
prior on some event, then if their posteriors are common knowledge, these poste-
riors must be equal, even if the agents’ updates are based on diﬀerent information.
This was proved for posterior probabilities in the context of a partitional informa-
tion structure.
Briefly, Ω is a finite set of states and any of its subsets E is an event. For each agent
i ∈ N there is an information function Ii : Ω → 2Ω; the information cell Ii(ω) is
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the set of states that i conceives as possible at state ω, and for each i ∈ N , it is as-
sumed that (i) ω ∈ Ii(ω), and (ii) Ii(ω) and Ii(ω￿) are either identical or disjoint, so
the set Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} partitions the state space. Furthermore, agent i is said
to “know” event E at state ω if ω ∈ Ii(ω) ⊆ E; and an operator Ki(.) is defined,
where “i knows event E” is the event Ki(E) = {ω ∈ Ω|Ii(ω) ⊆ E}. Informally,
E is common knowledge for a group of agents G ⊆ N if everyone knows that E,
everyone knows that everyone knows it, everyone knows that everyone knows that
everyone knows it, and so on ad infinitum. Note that in this framework, the knowl-
edge operator inherits the following properties: (i) Ki(E ∩ F ) = Ki(E) ∩Ki(F ),
(ii) Ki(E) ⊆ E, (iii) Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(Ki(E)) and (iv) Ω\Ki(E) ⊆ Ki(Ω\Ki(E)).
The robustness of the agreement result was tested through various generalisa-
tions. Still operating in a partitional structure, Cave (1983) and Bacharach (1985)
independently extended the probabilisitic result to general decision functions,
Di : F → A, that map from a field F of subsets of Ω into an arbitrary set A
of actions. To derive the result, it is assumed that agents have the same decision
function (termed “like-mindedness”), and that the decision functions satisfy what
we call the Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle (DSTP ): ∀E ∈ E , if Di(E) = x then
Di(∪E∈EE) = x, where E is a set of disjoint events.1 The following states their
result.2
If agents i and j are “like-minded”, decision functions satisfy DSTP ,
information is partitional, and it is common knowledge at some state
ω that i takes action x and j takes action y, then x = y.
Moses and Nachum (1990) criticise the result above on the grounds that defining
decisions over unions of information cells, as required by the DSTP is meaning-
less in the context of generalised decision functions. Bacharach’s decision functions
map from subsets of Ω to capture the idea that actions must be contingent upon
the agent’s information - in a similar manner to the way in which posterior proba-
bilities are contingent upon the information function at a given state. And, DSTP
is intended to capture the intuition that if one chooses to do x in every case where
one is “better informed” (e.g. Di(Ii(ω)) = x and Di(Ii(ω￿)) = x), then one must
also choose to do x when one is more “ignorant”. However, one’s decision when
one is being more ignorant in this case is taken to be Di(Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿)) = x. This
is problematic because Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿) has no defined informational content: The
primitives defining that determine the informational content of sets of states are
the information cells, but this union is merely a collection of states, so it is not
obvious what the agent knows in this case, since it is not an information cell.
1The DSTP is trivially satisfied when the decision functions are posterior probabilities.
2Note that Aumann (1976) can be derived as a corollary by defining a common prior proba-
bility distribution over the states, and by setting, for an event E, DEi (Ii(ω)) = Pr(E|Ii(ω)).
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There is a deeper problem however, which we can illustrate with the following
example. Suppose the state space is Ω = {ω,ω￿}, and two agents i and j such
that Ii(ω) = {ω} and Ii(ω￿) = ω￿, and Ij(ω) = {ω,ω￿}. Suppose for example, that
ω is the state in which a coin is facing heads up, whereas ω￿ is the state in which
the coin is facing tails up. The set of states in which i knows which side is up
is {ω,ω￿}; and since Ij(ω) ⊆ {ω,ω￿}, we can interpret the event E = {ω,ω￿} as
“Agent j knows that i knows which side is up”. Note that at each state, i knows E.
But now, suppose we take the union Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿). Now we may ask, what is the
informational content of this set? Well, on the one hand, since Ii(ω)∪ Ii(ω￿) ⊆ E,
it would appear that i knows E. That is, i knows that j knows that i knows which
side is up. On the other hand, it is not possible that i knows E because now, it
is no longer the case that i knows which side is up! This example suggests that
although cell union may be appropriate to capture “more ignorance” in a single-
agent setting, an incoherence arises where there is interactive information - events
of the type: i knows that j knows that E.
Moses and Nachum (1990) propose their our solution to the generalised agree-
ment theorem by defining a projection from states to an arbitrary set, intended
to capture the information at each state that is relevant to the decision, and the
decision functions map relevant information into actions. Now, relevant informa-
tion is defined over a variety of sets of states, so the above criticism is resolved.
However they require a stronger version of the Sure-Thing Principle, which does
not require the “disjointness” of the relevant information, which we term the Non-
Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle, NDSTP .
More recently, Aumann and Hart (2006) use the framework developed in Aumann
(1999) to reproduce the results of Bacharach and of Moses & Nachum in a coherent
approach. Our approach is largely similar to theirs.
In an altogether diﬀerent strand of the literature, Samet (1990) and Collins
(1997) prove agreement theorems, restricting themselves to decision functions as
posterior probabilities, but in a non-partitional information structure. This is an
important line of investigation since partitional structures imply that agents can
only know what is the case; in other words, agents cannot base their decisions on
false information. But surely, it is perfectly plausible for rational agents to do so.
The culprit is the assumption that for all ω ∈ Ω, ω ∈ Ii(ω) since the “actual” state
is always included in the set of states that the agent considers possible. Instead,
Collins (1997) imposes (i) Ii(ω) ￿= ∅ and (ii), if ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω) then Ii(ω￿) = Ii(ω).
Now, it is possible that ω ￿∈ Ii(ω) - in which case ω is called a blindspot for i
since at that state the agent considers it impossible - and the operator K is now
interpreted as a “belief” operator (since it is possible to believe what is false, but
not to know it; in particular, it is now no longer necessary that Ki(E) ⊆ E).
3
The result requires what we term the Zero-Priors assumption:3 The prior proba-
bility distribution must assign zero probability to every state that is a blindspot
for every agent. It is justified on the grounds that the states that an agent does not
consider possible should not aﬀect the agent’s decision. However, this assumption
is forcefully criticised by Collins (1997): Although it seems reasonable to say that
i’s prior must assign zero probability to the states that i considers impossible, it is
not reasonable to also require i’s prior to also assign zero probability to the states
that j considers impossible (although i might consider them possible).
Finally, in a similar vein, Bonanno and Nehring (1998) prove an agreement theo-
rem in a non-partitional information structure. They do this by assuming “quasi-
coherence” (defined later), and over functions that satisfy a “properness” condition.
If the function is “quantitative”, properness implies the Disjoint Sure-Thing Princi-
ple (in a manner that does not avoid the Moses and Nachum (1990) criticism); and
when it is “qualitative”, properness is equivalent to the Non-Disjoint Sure-Thing
Principle. Of course, this implies that the interpretation of properness depends on
the type of function that is used.
In this paper, we use standard concepts from epistemic logic to derive agree-
ment theorems with generalised decision functions in both partitional and non-
partitional models, that are analogous to the results mentioned above, but that
do not suﬀer from the incoherences pointed out by Moses and Nachum (1990).4
Avoiding the incoherences requires making some sacrifices: For example, we must
require the decision functions to be independent of interactive information, and,
the language in which the states are described must be “rich” - in some well-defined
sense. Finally, we are also able to prove agreement theorems in which less restric-
tions are imposed on the decision functions. Namely, we no longer require them
to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle (whether disjoint or not).
In section 2, we introduce the basic concepts that we use from epistemic logic.
In section 3, we expand the standard epistemic logic framework to encompass
decision functions, and we state our main assumptions. We derive our main results
in partitional models in section 4, and in non-partitional models in section 5. All
proofs are in the appendix.
3Termed “consistency” in Samet (1990).
4Although still working with a partitional structure, Samet (2010) takes an altogether diﬀerent
approach, deriving a generalised agreement theorem by assuming an “interpersonal” Sure-Thing
Principle (ISTP ), which is a condition imposed on decision functions across diﬀerent agents.
The generalisation of his result in our framework to non-partitional structures is the subject of
a companion paper (Tarbush (2011)).
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2 Epistemic Logic
This section introduces concepts from epistemic logic. All the definitions and re-
sults in this section are standard (e.g. see Chellas (1980) and van Benthem (2010)
for general reference).
We must develop the language that our results will be stated in. This will con-
sist in defining a syntax - which determines which symbols or chains of symbols
are part of the language (e.g. “dog” is permissible in the English language, but
“a@b6tt” is not) -, and in defining semantics - which assigns a meaning to the
symbols and thus determines a grammar (e.g. “The dog is sick” is semantically
permissible in the English language, but “Dog towards rain table” is not) -.
A proposition is a sentence, usually represented by a lower case letter. For exam-
ple, “The dog is sick”, and, “It is raining” can represented by p and q respectively.
Propositions can be combined in various ways using the standard Boolean opera-
tors : not, and, or, if...then, if and only if, which are represented by the following
symbols respectively ¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔. An example of a combination of propo-
sitions is “The dog is sick and it is raining” (formally p ∧ q).
Finally, we will also allow for modal operators in our language. These are op-
erators that qualify an entire proposition. For example, “I know that the dog is
sick” is made up of the proposition “The dog is sick” and the modal operator “I
know that”. We will have two basic symbols for modal operators in our language,
namely ￿i and CG, although their exact interpretation will be developed later.
Essentially, depending on semantics which we will specify later, ￿ip will either
stand for “Agent i knows that p”, or “Agent i believes that p”, whereas CGp will
either stand for “It is common knowledge among the subset of agents G that p”,
or “It is common belief among the subset of agent G that p”.
Propositions are atomic if they do not contain any operators (whether Boolean or
modal), and are thus reduced to the most basic building block. For example, “The
dog is sick” contains no operators, so cannot be made more basic, whereas “The
dog is sick and it is raining” can be reduced to two propositions, so is not atomic.
A formula is any chain of symbols that is acceptable in the language. Formally,
we construct the syntax, or the set of formulas in our language, as follows:
Definition 1 (Basic syntax). Define a finite set of atomic propositions, P , which
consists of all propositions that cannot be further reduced. Let N denote the set
of all agents. We then inductively create all the formulas in our language, L, as
follows:
(i) Every p ∈ P is a formula.
(ii) If ψ is a formula, so is ¬ψ.
(iii) If ψ and φ are formulas, then so is ψ ◦ φ, where ◦ is one of the following
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ωi,j ￿￿ ￿￿
j ￿￿ ω￿ i,j
￿￿
Figure 1: Example of a Kripke structure
Boolean operators: ∧, ∨, →, or ↔.
(iv) If ψ is a formula, then so •ψ, where • is one of the modal operators ￿i∈N or
CG⊆N .
(v) Nothing else is a formula.
So far, we have pure uninterpreted syntax. Indeed, “Agent i knows that it is
raining and knows that it is not raining” is a formula of our language (represented
as ￿iq∧￿i¬q), but surely it cannot be true. We therefore introduce the semantics
of our language to determine the truth or falsity of formulas. To do this we use
standard Kripke semantics.
Definition 2 (Kripke semantics). A frame is a pair ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, where Ω is a finite,
non-empty set of states (or “possible worlds”), and Ri ⊆ Ω×Ω is a binary relation
for each agent i, also called the accessibility relation for agent i. A model on a
frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, is a triple M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N ,V￿, where V : P × Ω → {0, 1} is a
valuation map.
Definition 3 (Truth). We say that a proposition p ∈ P is true at state ω in model
M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N ,V￿, denoted M,ω |= p, if and only if V(p,ω) = 1. Truth is then
extended inductively to all other formulas ψ as follows:
(i) M,ω |= ¬ψ if and only if it is not the case that M,ω |= ψ.
(ii) M,ω |= (ψ ∧ φ) if and only if M,ω |= ψ and M,ω |= φ.5
(iii) M,ω |= ￿iψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then M,ω￿ |= ψ.
(iv) M,ω |= CGψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω accessible from ω in a finite sequence of
Ri (i ∈ G ⊆ N) steps, M,ω￿ |= ψ.
The above definitions can be illustrated by the modelM = ￿Ω, Ri∈N ,V￿ repre-
sented in Figure 1. The state space is Ω = {ω,ω￿}. The accessibility relations for
agents i and j are as represented in the figure. Namely, Ri = {(ω,ω), (ω￿,ω￿)} and
Rj = {(ω,ω), (ω￿,ω￿), (ω,ω￿), (ω￿,ω)}. Finally, we can let P = {h, t}, V(h,ω) = 1,
and V(t,ω￿) = 1. From this alone, we can generate several new formulas. For
example, note that every state ω￿￿ that is accessible from ω for agent i is such that
ω￿￿ |= h (indeed, the only state that i can “access” from ω is ω itself, and h is true
at ω). Therefore, by the definition of truth, we have that ω |= ￿ih. Similarly, we
have ω￿ |= ￿it. On the other hand, we have ω |= ¬￿jh. This is because from ω, j
can “access” the state ω￿ in which h is not true, but rather t is true.
5The truth of formulas involving the other Boolean operators are similarly defined.
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We can even go further. One can verify that ω |= ￿ih ∨￿it and ω￿ |= ￿ih ∨￿it;
and therefore, ω |= ￿j(￿ih ∨￿it) and ω￿ |= ￿j(￿ih ∨￿it). In fact, since for any
state accessible from ω in a finite sequence of Rk (k ∈ {i, j}) steps, it is the case
that ￿ih ∨￿it, we can also conclude that ω |= C{i,j}(￿ih ∨￿it).
We can note that some formulas, such as ￿ih are only true at some state of the
model, whereas others, like ￿ih ∨ ￿it are true at every state in the model. The
latter are said to be valid in the model. But there are even more general levels of
validity. For example, suppose we keep the same states and accessibility relations
as the model in Figure 1, but modify the valuation map. Then, we obtain a set of
new models, all with the same frame. The formulas that remain true at every state
of each of these models are said to be valid in the frame. Even more generally, we
can allow the frame itself to vary, but within a class of frames. For example, we
could consider all the frames in which for every ω ∈ Ω, (ω,ω) ∈ Ri for each i ∈ N .
The formulas that remain true at every state of every model in every frame within
this class are said to be valid (within this class of frames). Formally, we have the
following definition.
Definition 4 (Validity). Formula ψ is valid in a model M, denoted M |= ψ
iﬀ ∀ω ∈ Ω in M, ω |= ψ. Formula ψ is valid in a frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, denoted
￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ |= ψ, iﬀ ∀M over ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿, M |= ψ. Formula ψ is T -valid (or valid),
denoted |= ψ, iﬀ ∀￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ ∈ T (T , a class of frames), ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ |= ψ.
The frame classes can be determined by the conditions that are imposed on
the accessibility relations. The following gives a selection of conditions that are
often used to classify frames.
Definition 5 (Conditions on frames). We say that a frame ￿Ω, Ri∈N￿ is,
(i) Reflexive if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω ∈ Ω,ωRiω.
(ii) Symmetric if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω,ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then ω￿Riω.
(iii) Transitive if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω,ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ and ω￿Riω￿￿ then ωRiω￿￿.
(iv) Euclidean if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω,ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ and ωRiω￿￿ then ω￿Riω￿￿.
(v) Serial if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃ω￿ ∈ Ω,ωRiω￿.
We will be interested in two particular classes of frames. One of them is the
S5 class, which consists of all frames that are reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
The other class, known as KD45, is the class of all frames that are transitive,
Euclidean and serial.
We have so far, in our example in Figure 1, been careful not to interpret the
symbol ￿ as a knowledge operator. Indeed, to allow such an interpretation, we
must guarantee that the operator possesses the properties that one might expect
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of knowledge. For example, one distinguishing characteristic of knowledge is that
one cannot know what is false. So, we must at least impose the restriction that
the formula ￿iψ → ψ for any agent i and any formula ψ, be valid.
It turns out that the following formulas are valid in S5 frames:
(i) Distribution: ￿i(ψ → φ)→ (￿iψ → ￿iφ).
(ii) Veracity: ￿iψ → ψ.
(iii) Positive introspection: ￿iψ → ￿i￿iψ.
(iv) Negative introspection: ¬￿iψ → ￿i¬￿iψ.
In fact, the converse also holds: Namely, if we require (i) - (iv) to be validities,
then the frame must be S5.
The formulas (i) - (iv) happen to be precisely the properties that are consid-
ered to be the defining characteristics of knowledge (Early formal philosophical
underpinnings can be found in Hintikka (1962)). For example, veracity states that
if i knows that ψ, then ψ must be true. In other words, one cannot know what
is false. Positive introspection states that if i knows that ψ, then i knows that i
knows that ψ. That is, if one knows something, then one knows that one knows it.
Finally, negative introspection states that if i does not know that ψ then i knows
that i does not know that ψ. That is, if one does not know something, then one
knows that one does not know it. Admittedly these are properties of a very strong
notion of what knowledge means. However, they are taken as standard, and we
will not discuss their justification. In fact, they are completely analogous to the
properties of the knowledge operator K mentioned in the introduction.
Given the above, we can return to the model given in Figure 1. One can verify
that the model has an S5 frame, and the modal operators can thus be interpreted
as knowledge and common knowledge.
In fact, the model can be seen as a representation of the following scenario: Suppose
agents i and j are in a room with a box. Inside the box is a coin, which can either
have the heads side facing up or the tails side facing up. Let h be the proposition
“The coin is heads side up”, and t be “The coin is tails side up”. Suppose that i
can look directly into the box, but j cannot; however, j can see that i can look
into the box.
It was shown previously that ω |= ￿ih, which means that in the state in which
the coin is indeed heads side up, agent i knows this (since he can see it). Also,
ω￿ |= ￿it means that in the state in which the coin is tails side up, i also knows
this. Furthermore, we had that ω |= ¬￿jh, so in the state in which the coin is
heads side up, j does not know that the coin is heads side up.
Note that the modal formulas in the above paragraph have a single modal operator,
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so are said to have a modal depth of 1. However, a formula such as ￿i￿jψ has
nested modal operators, and has a modal depth of 2. In our example, the formula
￿j(￿ih∨￿it), interpreted as “j knows that i knows which side of the coin is facing
up”, has a modal depth of 2.6 Clearly, interactive knowledge - of the form “I know
that you know...” - requires a modal depth of at least 2. A formal definition of
this notion is given below.
Definition 6 (Modal depth). The modal depth md(ψ) of a formula ψ is the
maximal length of a nested sequence of modal operators. This can be defined
by the following recursion on our syntax rules: (i) md(p) = 0 for any p ∈ P , (ii)
md(¬ψ) = md(ψ), (iii) md(ψ ∧ φ) = md(ψ ∨ φ) = md(ψ → φ) = md(ψ ↔ φ) =
max(md(ψ),md(φ)), (iv) md(￿iψ) = 1 +md(ψ), (v) md(CGψ) = 1 +md(ψ).
Finally, returning to our example one last time, we showed that C{i,j}(￿ih∨￿it)
is valid in the model. This is interpreted as it being common knowledge among
i and j that i knows which side is facing up, in the sense that they both know
this, both know that they know it, both know that they know that they know it,
and so on ad infinitum. This is the interpretation of the CG operator because,
completely generally, if M,ω |= CGψ, then one can generate any formula of finite
modal depth of the form ￿i￿j...￿rψ with i, j...r ∈ G, and this formula will be
true at ω in model M.7
3 Models with information and decisions
All the definitions in this section are completely general, so hold for arbitrary frame
classes. It will firstly be useful to define the following, frequently used concept.
Definition 7 (Component). For any ω ∈ Ω, we will denote the set of all states
that are accessible from ω in a finite sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps, by ΩG(ω). We
will call this set the component of ω.
Now, let P be a finite set of atomic propositions. Since P is finite, its closure
under the standard Boolean operators, denoted P ∗, is tautologically finite.8 So
6Obviously, we could have created a more complicated model representing a situation where
j does not see that i can see into the box. That is, a situation in which j does not know that i
knows which side is facing up.
7Note that the definition of the operator CG is drawn from van Benthem (2010), where it is also
mentioned that an alternative definition can be given: One can define a new accessibility relation
R∗G for the whole group G as the reflexive transitive closure of the union of all separate relations
Ri (i ∈ G), and then simply let M,ω |= CGψ if and only if ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωR∗Gω￿ then M,ω￿ |= ψ.
8In the sense that there is only a finite number of inequivalent formulas (so p and p∧ p count
as one).
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P ∗ is just the set of all possible inequivalent formulas that can be created out of
the propositions in P and the Boolean operators. Let Ψr0 be the set of all possible
modal formulas that can be generated from P ∗ with modal depth 0 up to r for an
arbitrary r ∈ N0. Again, since P ∗ is finite, so is Ψr0, so |Ψr0| = m, for some m ∈ N;
and note that Ψ00 = P ∗.9
Definition 8 (New operators). For each agent i ∈ N create a set of modal
operators, Oi = {￿i, ￿ˆi, ￿˙i}, where for every formula ψ, ￿ˆiψ := ￿i¬ψ and
￿˙iψ := ¬(￿iψ ∨ ￿ˆiψ).
In S5, ￿ˆiψ stands for “Agent i knows that it is not the case that ψ”, and ￿˙iψ
stands for “Agent i does not know whether it is the case that ψ”.
Definition 9 (Kens). Order the set Ψr0 into a vector of length m: (ψ1,ψ2, ...,ψm),
and for each agent i ∈ N , create the sets
Ui = {(ν1i ψ1 ∧ ν2i ψ2 ∧ ... ∧ νmi ψm)|∀n ∈ {1, ...,m}, νni ∈ Oi}
Vi = {νi ∈ Ui| |= ¬(νi ↔ (p ∧ ¬p))}
A ken (νi ∈ Vi) for agent i, describes i’s information concerning every formula in
Ψr0. So, calling νni ψn the nth entry of i’s ken, νni ψn states whether i knows that the
formula ψn is the case, or knows that it is not the case, or does not know whether
it is the case.
Note that Vi is a restriction of Ui to the set of kens that are not logically equivalent
to a contradiction; so only the logically consistent kens are considered.
The following lemma shows that at each state, there exists a ken for each agent
which holds at that state, and moreover, that any two diﬀerent kens must be
contradictory at any given state.
Lemma 1. (i) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∃νi ∈ Vi,ω |= νi, (ii) ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀νi, µi ∈ Vi, if νi ￿= µi then
ω |= ¬(νi ∧ µi).
By the above lemma, there is a unique ken in Vi that holds at a given state.
So for any νi ∈ Vi, if ω |= νi, we can index the ken by the state, denoting it, ν(ω)i.
Definition 10 (Informativeness). Create an order ￿⊆ Vi×Vj for all i, j ∈ N . We
say that the ken νi is more informative than the ken µj, denoted νi ￿ µj, if and
only if whenever i knows that ψ then j either also knows that ψ or does not know
whether ψ, and whenever i does not know whether ψ, then so does j.10
9If P = {p, q}, then one can generate 20 inequivalent formulas: 2 from p alone, 2 from q alone
and 16 out of p and q together, so |P ∗| = 20.
10Formally, (i) if νni ψn = ￿iψn then (µnj ψn = ￿jψn or µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn), (ii) if νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn
then (µnj ψn = ￿ˆjψn or µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn), and (iii) if νni ψn = ￿˙iψn then (µnj ψn = ￿˙jψn).
10
Note that ￿ is not a complete order on kens. For example, consider any two kens
νi and µi for agent i, in which the nth entry is νnj ψn = ￿iψn and µnjψn = ￿ˆiψn.
These two kens would not be comparable with ￿.
Finally, note that νi ∼ µj denotes νi ￿ µj and µj ￿ νi; which is interpreted as νi
and µj carrying the same information, but seen from the perspectives of agents i
and j respectively.
The infimum of νi and µi, denoted inf{νi, µi}, is the most informative ken that is
less informative than νi and µi. Incidentally, this is a main point where our analysis
diﬀers from Bacharach (1985): An incoherence exists in his framework because the
union of two information cells is not itself an information cell. However, we do not
encounter this conceptual diﬃculty because the infimum of two kens (our analogue
to cell union) is itself a ken, as shown below.
Lemma 2. For any νi, µi ∈ Vi, inf{νi, µi} exists in Vi and is characterised by:
inf{νi, µi}nψn = ￿iψn iﬀ (νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿iψn)
inf{νi, µi}nψn = ￿ˆiψn iﬀ (νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿ˆiψn)
inf{νi, µi}nψn = ￿˙iψn iﬀ (νni ψn ￿= µni ψn or νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿˙iψn)
Definition 11 (Decision function). For each i ∈ N , Di : Vi → A, is the decision
function of agent i, where A is a set of actions.
Definition 12 (Action function). For all νi ∈ Vi, |= νi → dDi(νi)i
The action function di selects the action that is actually chosen at each state.11
“Di(νi) = x” is read as “if i’s ken is νi, then i’s decision is to do x”, whereas “dxi ” is
read as “i performs action x”. So although the decision function, Di, determines
what the agent would do over all possible kens, dDi(νi)i is the formula - added to
the syntax - describing the agent performing the action that her decision function
requires her to take given the ken she has at each particular state.12
Definition 13 (Richness). (i) The language in a component ΩG(ω) is rich if and
only if for all i ∈ G, and any pair ν(ω￿)i, µ(ω￿￿)i such that ν(ω￿)i ￿= µ(ω￿￿)i and
ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), there is n ∈ {1, ...,m} such that νni = ￿i and µni = ￿ˆi.
(ii) The language in a component ΩG(ω) is very rich if and only if for all i ∈ G,
and any ν(ω￿)i such that ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), there is no n ∈ {1, ...,m} such that νni = ￿˙i.
11Lemma 1 guarantees that the action function is well-defined.
12Technically, we let all propositions of the form “Di(νi) = x” live in a set D, and all proposi-
tions of the form “dxi ” live in a set Q. Then the set of a propositions is P = P ∪ D ∪Q, so the
valuation function is V : P × Ω→ {0, 1}.
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Essentially, the language in a component is rich if any two distinct kens in the
component for agent i are incomparable via ￿. In other words, any two distinct
kens must be contradictory about some “fact” - i.e. formula - (in the sense that
in one ken, the agent knows that it is true, whereas in the other ken, the agent
knows that it is false). Richness is how we capture the idea of “disjointness” in our
framework.13 Furthermore, when the language is very rich in a component, there
is no ken in which the agent is “unsure” about some fact, in the sense that he/she
does not know whether it is true or false. That is, of every fact at every state of
the component, the agent either knows that it is true, or knows that it is false.
Below, we show how richness can be given an interpretation in terms of “signals”,
which is closer to the discussion given in Aumann et al. (2005).
3.1 Main assumptions
We will assume two distinct versions of the Sure-Thing Principle, and prove an
agreement theorem with each respectively. The first version is the analogue of
the “non-disjoint” version used by Moses and Nachum (1990), which we state as a
formula, NDSTP , that we assume to be valid:
Assumption 1 (Non-Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle).
At every state ω ∈ Ω, it is true that for every agent i ∈ N and all νi, µi ∈ Vi, if
Di(νi) = Di(µi) then Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi).
This states that whenever an agent would take the same decision given the in-
formation νi and µi, then the agent would take the same decision over the infimum
of those kens - i.e. in the situation in which the agents is “just” less informed. The
second version of the Sure-Thing Principle, which we call DTSP , is closer to the
original one used by Bacharach (1985), because it requires disjointness. In our
framework, DSTP is simply NDSTP but is only required to hold over kens that
are expressed in a “rich” language.
Assumption 1’ (Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle).
Let Ti = {(νi, µi) ∈ Vi × Vi|∃n such that νni = ￿i and µni = ￿ˆi}. At every state
ω ∈ Ω, it is true that for every agent i ∈ N and all νi, µi ∈ Ti, if Di(νi) = Di(µi)
then Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi).
The above versions of the Sure-Thing Principle can be illustrated by means
13Note that richness is analogous to what we understand as the requirement that all knowledge
be “elementary” in Aumann and Hart (2006); and is intended to capture the idea that the
information be “disjoint” (in line with the Sure-Thing Principle of Bacharach (1985)).
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of the following example.14 Suppose i sends out an invitation for a dinner party
to Alice, Bob and Charlie, and define νi to be the ken in which i knows that
Alice is coming to the dinner, but does not know whether Bob is coming to the
dinner and does not know whether Charlie is coming to the dinner (νi = ￿ia ∧
￿˙ib ∧ ￿˙ic). Furthermore, let µi be the ken in which i knows that Bob is coming
to the dinner, but does not know whether Alice is coming to the dinner and
does not know whether Charlie is coming to the dinner (µi = ￿˙ia ∧ ￿ib ∧ ￿˙ic).
Suppose furthermore, that Di(νi) = Di(µi). The NDSTP would then require that
Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(￿˙ia ∧ ￿˙ib ∧ ￿˙ic) = Di(νi). That is, i must take the same
decision when i does not know anything about whether any guests are coming to
the dinner.
The above example illustrates how strong an assumption the NDSTP is: The
agent is required to make the same decision, jumping directly from νi and µi to a
situation in which essentially, nothing is known. But many other kens could have
been cycled through as well, and the same decision would have been required! For
example ￿˙ia ∧ ￿˙ib ∧￿ic.
To remedy this, suppose we reformulated the situation as “The agent knows that
Alice sent an RSVP and knows that Bob and Charlie did not”. Letting a￿ stand
for “Alice sent an RSVP”, we have ν ￿i = ￿ia￿ ∧ ￿ˆib￿ ∧ ￿ˆic￿. Similarly, we have
µ￿i = ￿ˆia￿ ∧ ￿ib￿ ∧ ￿ˆic￿. Now, the pair of kens ν ￿￿i = νi ∧ ν ￿i and µ￿￿i = µi ∧ µ￿i is
“rich” in the sense that there is a proposition, namely a￿ for which ￿ia￿ in one ken,
and ￿ˆia￿ in the other. In fact, ν ￿￿i and µ￿￿i include all the information, including all
the information about how the information was acquired, i.e. the “signals” (in the
form of propositions regarding whether or not the guests sent an RSVP). Aumann
et al. (2005) argue that in this case, the DSTP is a reasonable assumption, so if
one takes the same decision in the case of ν ￿￿i and µ￿￿i , then the same decision must
be taken over inf{ν ￿￿i , µ￿￿i }.
Note that the pair of kens ν ￿i and µ￿i that only consider information regarding
signals and discard the rest, are “very rich” in the sense that everything is solely
expressed in terms of “knowing that” or “knowing that not”.
Assumption 2 (Like-mindedness). At every state ω ∈ Ω, it is true that for any
νi ∈ Vi and νj ∈ Vj, if νi ∼ νj then Di(νi) = Dj(νj).
The assumption of like-mindedness captures the idea that the agents would
take the same decision if they had the same information.
14Note that the assumptions can be stated completely formally as valid formulas:
|= NDSTP := ￿i∈N ￿νi,µi∈Vi [Di(νi) = Di(µi) → Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi)]|= DSTP := ￿i∈N ￿(νi,µi)∈Ti [Di(νi) = Di(µi) → Di(inf{νi, µi}) = Di(νi)]
And, they are guaranteed to be well-defined by Lemma 2.
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Figure 2: State space in S5
Assumption 3 (State-independent decision functions). The decision function is
invariant across all states for each agent. That is, for any ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, if ω￿ |= D￿i(.)
and ω￿￿ |= D￿￿i (.), then ω￿ |= D￿i(.) = D￿￿i (.) and ω￿￿ |= D￿i(.) = D￿￿i (.).15
In a sense, this allows us to imagine our models being constructed as follows:
Formulas of the form dxi are made true or false at given states by the valuation
map. But, there exists some “global” decision function Di for each agent such that
Di(ν(ω)i) = x whenever ω |= dxi .
4 Generalised results in S5
In S5, the accessibility relation Ri of each agent i is reflexive, symmetric and tran-
sitive. So it is an equivalence relation for each i ∈ N . Let Ii(ω) = {ω￿ ∈ Ω|ωRiω￿}
be the information cell of i at ω. One can verify that the set Ii = {Ii(ω)|ω ∈ Ω}
is a partition of the state space Ω - we thus have a partitional model.
We provide a schematic representation of an S5 model in Figure 2. The state
space is Ω = {ω1, ...,ω9}. The partition for agent i is given by the set Ii =
{{ω1}, {ω5}, {ω2,ω3}, {ω4,ω7}, {ω6,ω8,ω9}}. Agent j’s partition is found simi-
larly. Furthermore, Ω{i,j}(ω1) = {ω1,ω4,ω7}, and Ω{i,j}(ω2) = Ω\Ω{i,j}(ω1).
The following lemma states that in S5, the information cells of every agent
exhaust any component.
Lemma 3. ∀i ∈ G, ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω￿) = ΩG(ω).
The lemma below states that kens are identical across all the states that are
in the same information cell.
15This could equivalently be stated as ν(ω)i ∼ ν(ω￿)i → Di(ν(ω)i) = Di(ν(ω￿)i).
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Lemma 4. If for some ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿ |= νi, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= νi.
It will now be useful to introduce a new definition which will eventually allow
us to provide a semantic characterisation of inf{νi, µi} for any kens νi, µi ∈ Vi.
Definition 14 (Cell merge). Consider a model in S5, M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N , V ￿. Let
Ii(ω) = {ω￿￿ ∈ Ω|ωRiω￿￿} and Ii(ω￿) = {ω￿￿ ∈ Ω|ω￿Riω￿￿}. Create a new model
M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)) = ￿Ω￿, R￿i∈N , V ￿￿ where,
Ω￿ = Ω
R￿i = R
￿￿
i ∪Ri|Ω\Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω￿)
where R￿￿i = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿)}
and Ri|Ω\Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω￿) = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Ri|ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ω\Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿)}
R￿j = Rj for all j ￿= i
V ￿ = V
One can verify that the model M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)) is itself a model in S5, but where
the cells Ii(ω) and Ii(ω￿) are merged to form a single information cell (with all the
accessibility relations appropriately “rewired”), yet leaving the rest of the original
model, M, unchanged.
For sake of illustration, let us return to the example given in Figure 2. Let
the model represented be M. We can, for example, create the “merged” model,
M(Ii(ω4), Ii(ω5)), in which j’s information partition is unchanged, but i’s parti-
tion is now {{ω1}, {ω2,ω3}, {ω4,ω5,ω7}, {ω6,ω8,ω9}}.
The following lemmas provides a semantic characterisation of inf{νi, µi} in S5,
which turns out to be the ken that holds in a model in which the information cells,
at which νi and µi hold, are merged.
Lemma 5. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0.
IfM,ω |= νi andM,ω￿ |= µi, then for all ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω￿),M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)),ω￿￿￿ |=
inf{νi, µi}.
Lemma 6. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0 and let G = {i, j}.
For any ΩG(ω), inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
Finally, we are in a position to state our agreement results in S5:
Theorem 1. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose NDSTP holds, the agents are
like-minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states, and the system
is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
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Theorem 2. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose assumptions DSTP holds, the
agents are like-minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states, the
language is rich in every component, and the system is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N .
Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
4.1 Discussion
The intuition behind the results is that each agent has some ken at the actual state
ω, and based on this ken, say ν(ω)i, the agent actually takes the action dxi . How-
ever, the Sure-Thing Principle allows us to discover that i’s decision would also be
x if i’s information were inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. This is not the ken that i has
ω, so i’s action is not taken based on this ken. However, responding to Moses and
Nachum (1990), it has a clear interpretation: It is the most informative ken that
is less informative than any ken that i has at any state in the common knowledge
component; and if this were i’s ken, then i’s decision would be x. However, over
a similar ken, we find that j’s decision would be y. But since this is the same
uninformative ken, and agents are like-minded, we conclude that x = y.
Note the role of the infimum of kens in the theorems: Eﬀectively, it only preserves
those propositions that both agents know. Any proposition p where i knows that
p while j knows that ¬p, or where i knows that p and j does not know whether
p is discarded. That is, implicitly, the only information that becomes relevant for
the decisions of the agents is the information on which they already agree.
Theorem 1 in particular, highlights an awkwardness of the agreement results:
If we require the weaker version of the Sure-Thing Principle to hold (DSTP ),
then whether or not the agreement theorem holds depends on the richness of the
language. In other words, it depends on the way in which the environment is de-
scribed! (That is, if the language were not rich enough in every component, then
agreement would not necessarily follow).
We should note that in S5, if we assume the language to be very rich in some
component, this has the remarkable implication that both agents must have the
same information at every state of the component.
Proposition 1. Suppose the language is very rich in some component ΩG(ω).
Then, for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= νi ∼ µj.
A direct corollary of this is that agents cannot agree to disagree if they are like-
minded, even if the decision functions do not satisfy any version of the Sure-Thing
Principle. Agreement becomes trivial since they always have the same information.
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Theorem 3. Suppose the agents are like-minded and the language is very rich in
every component, and the system is S5. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧
dyj )→ (x = y).
For a discussion of this theorem, see Theorem 7 below.
Regarding both theorems, it should be noted that they are stated with global
assumptions, but local assumptions would have suﬃced: We could have required
that the assumed validities hold true at each state of the component rather than
at every state of the state space. This highlights to point that even if all the con-
ditions required for the agreement results to hold are not satisfied everywhere in a
model, there may exist “pockets” in the state space in which agents cannot agree to
disagree - because the conditions do hold in those components - and others where
they can agree to disagree.
Furthermore, both rely on the restriction that only Ψr0 with r = 0 be consid-
ered (that is, Ψ00 = P ∗). This means that decisions cannot be based on formulas
involving nested modal operators; that is, on interactive information.16 This is
analogous to the assumption made in Aumann and Hart (2006) that decisions be
substantive: “Only knowledge of elementary facts matters, not knowledge about
knowledge (i.e. interactive knowledge)”.17 To see how restrictive this assumption
is, let us return to our example of the coin in the box given in Figure 1. Suppose
that i and j are required to write what side of the coin is facing up on a piece of
paper. If they get it right, they earn a prize. Now, if j’s decision can depend on
the fact that she know that i knows what side is facing up, j can write: “The side
that is facing up is the one that i says is facing up”. However, if this interactive
information must be ignored, this strategy is, as far as j is concerned, just as good
as simply guessing, since she might as well not know that i knows which side is
facing up.
The reason for the restriction is that Lemma 5 does not hold for Ψr0 if r > 0. This
is because the truth of formulas of a modal depth one or greater is fully determined
by the accessibility relations of all agents. The trouble is that by moving from the
model M to a merged model M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)), we are modifying the accessibility
relations, and there is no guarantee that truth of higher depth formulas will remain
unchanged, so kens in the merged model may be incomparable (via ￿) with the
kens in the original model.
Figure 3 provides a counter-example to Lemma 5 when r > 0: Suppose that in both
16Note: Tarbush (2011) finds that a distinguishing feature of the agreement result in Samet
(2010) is that it holds for all r ≥ 0.
17This avoids the criticism of Moses and Nachum (1990) concerning the like-mindedness as-
sumption.
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Figure 3: Merge with r > 0
models, ω |= p and ω￿ |= ¬p. One can verify that for all ω ∈ Ω, M,ω |= ￿i￿ˆj￿˙ip,
and M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)),ω |= ￿ˆi￿ˆj￿˙ip. Therefore, whatever ken i might have in the
merged model, it is incomparable (via ￿) with her kens in the original model.
Of course, the upshot of this is that, given our other assumptions, agents can
agree to disagree if their decision functions are allowed to depend on interactive
information.
Finally in S5, we can show that our framework can be mapped directly into
that of Bacharach (1985), and is essentially identical to that of Aumann and
Hart (2006) (see Appendix B). However, the framework developed here has some
advantages: (i) The use of epistemic logic allows for a very transparent account
of the conditions on the modal depth of formulas, (ii) the ordering ￿ on kens
gives a clear definition of informativeness, and hence of inf{νi, µi}, (iii) explicitly
modelling the accessibility relations between states allows us to easily consider
extensions in a non-partitional state space, and finally (iv) our approach allows us
to unify and compare the results of the literature in one methodological approach.
5 Generalised result in KD45
We have so far derive all our results within partitional models - that is, in S5
frames. However, the ￿ operator has very strong properties in such frames. In
particular, one cannot “know” what is false. But there is nothing inherent to the
notion of rationality that requires rational agents to base their decisions only on
correct information. For this reason, we will consider KD45 frames, in which the
accessibility relations are transitive, Euclidean and serial. The following formulas
are valid in KD45 frames:
(i) Distribution: ￿i(ψ → φ)→ (￿iψ → ￿iφ).
(ii) Consistency: ￿iψ → ¬￿i¬ψ.
(iii) Positive introspection: ￿iψ → ￿i￿iψ.
(iv) Negative introspection: ¬￿iψ → ￿i¬￿iψ.
The converse also holds: Namely, if we require (i) - (iv) to be validities, then the
frame must be KD45.
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These validities describe the properties that we would require ￿ to satisfy in order
to be interpreted as a belief, rather than a knowledge, operator (Again, see Hin-
tikka (1962) for philosophical underpinnings). Essentially, the only diﬀerence is
that unlike knowledge, belief is not infallible: By dropping reflexivity, it is possible
to have ￿ip ∧ ¬p in a KD45 frame - that is, agents are allowed to believe what is
false, and thus to base decision on false information. Note however, that agents
are at least required to have consistent beliefs.
One can verify that all S5 frames are also KD45 frames, but the converse is not
true. In fact, S5 = KD45 + reflexivity.
We can provide a description of the links between states in a KD45 frame:
Some sets of states within Ω are “completely connected”, in the sense that the
accessibility relation over states within such sets in an equivalence relation, so these
sets have the same properties as information cells in S5; and, for each one of these
completely connected sets there exists a (possibly empty) set of “associated” states
that have arrows pointing from them to every state in the completely connected
set, but with no arrow (by the same agent) pointing towards them. The set of
all completely connected sets and their set of associated states exhaust the state
space.
Formally, let Si(ω) = {ω￿ ∈ Ω|ωEiω￿}, where Ei is an equivalence relation. We
call this set of completely connected states the information sink of state ω for
player i. The set Si do not necessarily partition the state space, hence we have
a non-partitional model. Note, that this way of defining the sink guarantees that
if Si(ω) ￿= ∅ then ω ∈ Si(ω). Furthermore, we define ω’s set of associated states
as Ai(ω) = {ω￿￿ ∈ Ω|∀ω￿￿￿ ∈ Si(ω),ω￿￿Fiω￿￿￿}, where Fi is now a simple arrow. So,
note that now, for any agent i, we have that Ri = Ei ∪ Fi. Finally, we can define
Ji(ω) = Si(ω)∪Ai(ω), and note that Ji = {Ji(ω)|ω ∈ Ω} exhausts the entire state
space.
Proposition 2. The above is a complete characterisation of the KD45 state space.
We provide a schematic representation of a KD45 model in Figure 4. For ex-
ample, i’s information sink at state ω4 is the set Si(ω4) = {ω4,ω5}, and the set of
associated states is Ai(ω4) = {ω1,ω2,ω3}. Furthermore, note for example that the
component of state ω1 is the set Ω{i,j}(ω1) = Ω\{ω1,ω7}, so it is now possible that
ω ￿∈ ΩG(ω).
We can see how having false beliefs is possible in such frames: For example, let
ω1 |= ¬p and ω4 |= p. Then, ω1 |= ￿jp ∧ ¬p. This also shows how it is only in the
sets Ai that the agent could potentially hold false beliefs.
We will need to add the following assumptions to derive the main results:
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Figure 4: State space in KD45
Assumption 4 (Heterogeneity). If for all i ∈ G, and for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω￿)i =
ν(ω)i, then for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω￿)i ∼ ν(ω￿)j.18
This assumption is termed “heterogeneity” because it is equivalent to the state-
ment: Either for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω￿)i ∼ ν(ω￿)j; or, there exists an i ∈ G such that
ν(ω￿)i ￿= ν(ω)i for some ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). That is, in any component, either the agents
have the same information, or at least one of the agents has diﬀerent information
at a diﬀerent state in the component.
The following lemmas are generalisations of the ones found for S5.
Lemma 7. ∀i ∈ G, ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω￿) ⊆ ΩG(ω) ⊆ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω￿).
Lemma 8. If for some ω￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿ |= νi, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿￿ |= νi.
Definition 15 (Sink merge). Consider a model in KD45, M = ￿Ω, Ri∈N , V ￿.
Let Ji(ω) = Si(ω) ∪ Ai(ω) and Ji(ω￿) = Si(ω￿) ∪ Ai(ω￿). Create a new model
18Note that this is equivalently stated as: For all ω ∈ Ω, ω |= CG(ν(ω)i ∧ µ(ω)j) →￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω)(ν(ω
￿)i ∼ µ(ω￿)j). Obviously, this also implies that for all ω ∈ Ω, ω |= CG(ν(ω)i ∧
µ(ω)j) → (ν(ω)i ∼ µ(ω)j).
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M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω￿)) = ￿Ω￿, R￿i∈N , V ￿￿ where,
Ω￿ = Ω
R￿i = E
￿
i ∪ F ￿i
E ￿i = E
￿￿
i ∪ Ei|Ω\Si(ω)∪Si(ω￿)
where E ￿￿i = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω￿)}
and Ei|Ω\Si(ω)∪Si(ω￿) = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Ei|ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ω\Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω￿)}
F ￿i = F
￿￿
i ∪ Fi|Ω\Ai(ω)∪Ai(ω￿)
where F ￿￿i = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Ω× Ω|ω￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω) ∪ Ai(ω￿),ω￿￿￿ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω￿)}
and Fi|Ω\Ai(ω)∪Ai(ω￿) = {(ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿) ∈ Fi|ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ω\Ai(ω) ∪ Ai(ω￿)}
R￿j = Rj for all j ￿= i
V ￿ = V
One can verify that the model M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω￿)) is itself a model in KD45, but
where Ji(ω) and Ji(ω￿) are merged to form a new information sink with a set of
associated states, yet leaving the rest of the original model, M, unchanged.
For sake of illustration, let us return to the example given in Figure 4. Let
the model represented be M. We can, for example, create the “merged” model,
M(Jj(ω1), Jj(ω8)), in which i’s accessibility relation is unchanged, but j now has
a sink Si(ω8) = {ω4,ω8,ω9} and a set of associated states Aj(ω8) = {ω1}. That
is, there is an equivalence relation over the states in Si(ω8), and there are arrows
from ω1 pointing to each of the states in Si(ω8); and, the relations between the
rest of the states remain as they were in the original model for j.
Lemma 9. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0.
IfM,ω |= νi andM,ω￿ |= µi, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω)∪Ji(ω￿),M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω￿)),ω￿￿ |=
inf{νi, µi}.
Lemma 10. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, and suppose heterogeneity holds.
Let G = {i, j}. For any ΩG(ω), inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
We can now state our generalised agreement results in KD45.
Theorem 4. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose NDSTP holds, the agents are like-
minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states, heterogeneity holds,
and the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
Theorem 5. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose DSTP holds, the agents are like-
minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states, heterogeneity holds,
the language is rich in every component, and the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆
N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
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Figure 5: Example of disagreement when heterogeneity does not hold
5.1 Discussion
Heterogeneity requires that at least some agent has some variation in her infor-
mation in the set ΩS(ω) (or that the agents’ information be the same). Note that
the assumption is always satisfied in an S5 model.
Proposition 3. Let the system be S5 and G = {i, j}. If for all i ∈ G, and for all
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω￿)i = ν(ω)i, then for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ν(ω￿)i ∼ ν(ω￿)j.
We construct a model in which heterogeneity fails (where both agents have no
variation in their information), and show that the agents can agree to disagree.
Consider the model represented in Figure 5 and suppose that ω |= p, and ω￿ |= ¬p.
In this model, at every state, i believes that p is the case, whereas j believes that
¬p is the case. So we can let i’s decision at every state be x while letting j’s be y.
An interpretation of this example is that the agents are systematically biased in
the way they acquire new information. For example, suppose Alice and Bob have
a decision function whereby they leave the country if they believe that taxes will
rise after the election, and stay if they believe that taxes stay the same. Now,
suppose that in state ω, Alice consults one expert, and in ω￿, she consults another,
but both experts tell her that taxes will rise; so Alice would always come to believe
that taxes will rise, so she decides to leave the country. On the other hand, in
state ω, Bob consults one expert, and another in ω￿, but in both cases, he is told
that taxes will not rise, so he always comes to believe that they will not rise, and
thus decides to stay.
Now, even though it is the case that Bob knows that Alice will leave the country,
and he knows that she has the same decision function as he does, he cannot
“update” his decision when he is given the information about her decision, because
there is simply no other information that he deems it is possible to acquire.
5.1.1 A taxonomy of conditions
In this section, we contrast and compare various conditions that have been used in
the literature in relation to agreement theorems. This will allow us to place het-
erogeneity in relation to more familiar conditions, and also to provide a discussion
22
of the richness assumption in KD45.
Each condition will be given semantically (a), and essentially syntactically (b).19
Definition 16 (Condition 1). Condition (1.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there
exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω￿) = Sj(ω￿). Condition (1.b): For all ω ∈ Ω
and i, j ∈ G, there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ν(ω￿)i ∼ ν(ω￿)j.
Definition 17 (Condition 2). Condition (2.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there
exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω￿) ⊆ Sj(ω￿). Condition (2.b): For all ω ∈ Ω
and i, j ∈ G, there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ν(ω￿)i ￿ ν(ω￿)j, and there exists
an ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ν(ω￿￿)j ￿ ν(ω￿￿)i.
Condition 1 states that in any component, there must exist a state in which
both agents have the same ken. Syntactically: The agents must jointly consider
it possible that they have the same information. Condition 2 states that in any
component, a state must exist in which i’s ken is more informative than j’s, and
a state must exist in which j’s ken is more informative than i’s.
Definition 18 (Condition 3). Condition (3.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there
exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ∪ω￿￿∈ΩG(ω￿)Si(ω￿￿) = ∪ω￿￿∈ΩG(ω￿)Sj(ω￿￿). Condition
(3.b): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that for all
ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= (
￿
n∈{1,...,m}
￿
i∈G￿iψn → ψn).
Definition 19 (Condition 4). Condition (4.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G,
there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω￿) ⊆ ∪ω￿￿∈ΩG(ω)Sj(ω￿￿). Condition (4.b):
Heterogeneity.
Condition 3 and 4 are clearly weaker counterparts of conditions 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Their direct interpretation is not obvious. However, their syntactic implica-
tions are interpretable: Condition (3.b) is what Bonanno and Nehring (1998) term
quasi-coherence: “agents consider it jointly possible that they commonly believe
that what they believe is true”. They show that it is equivalent to the impossibility
of unbounded gains from betting (with moderately risk averse agents), which gives
it normative appeal. Condition (4.b) is simply heterogeneity: “if agents’ beliefs
(kens) are commonly believed, then their beliefs (kens) must be the same”.
Definition 20 (Condition 5). Condition (5.a): For all ω ∈ Ω and i, j ∈ G, there
exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that Si(ω￿)∩Sj(ω￿) ￿= ∅. Condition (5.b): For all ω ∈ Ω
and i, j ∈ G, there exists an ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω￿ |= (
￿
n∈{1,...,m} ¬(￿iψn ∧
￿ˆjψn)).
19The (b) conditions are syntactic in the sense that they could be stated purely in our syn-
tax, but they are complicated formulas so stating them explicitly might obscure their meaning.
Heterogeneity is an example.
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Figure 6: Taxonomy of conditions
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Figure 7: Quasi-coherence fails but heterogeneity holds
This condition states that it cannot be the case that all the information sinks
are disjoint across agents. (Syntactically: The agents must jointly consider it
possible that they are not completely at odds about every “fact” - i.e. one believes
that it is the case while the other believes that it is not the case). Obviously,
imposing such a condition would rule out the scenario represented in Figure 5.
Proposition 4. The arrows (⇒) represent logical implication in Figure 6.
Notably, it is shown that quasi-coherence implies heterogeneity. However, the
converse does not hold, as shown in Figure 7. Suppose that ω |= p, ω￿ |= p and
ω￿￿ |= ¬p. Clearly, there is a state, namely ω￿￿ in ΩG(ω) at which (ω￿￿,ω￿￿) ￿∈ Ri so
quasi-coherence fails. However, at ω |= ￿jp whereas ω￿￿ |= ￿˙jp so heterogeneity
holds.
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Figure 8: Condition (5.b) holds and heterogeneity fails (left); Heterogeneity holds
and (5.b) fails (right)
On the other hand, there is no implication in either direction between het-
erogeneity and condition (5.b). In the model on the left in Figure 8, let ω |= p,
ω￿ |= ¬p and ω￿￿ |= p. It is easy to see that condition (5.b) holds since the sinks
intersect at ω. However, ￿ip holds at every state while ￿˙jp holds at every state, so
heterogeneity fails. However, in the model on the right, let ω |= p∧q, ω￿ |= ¬q∧¬p,
ω￿￿ |= q ∧ ¬p and ω￿￿￿ |= p ∧ ¬q. One can verify that at every state, there exists a
proposition ψ such that ￿iψ ∧ ￿ˆjψ, so (5.b) fails. However, there is variation in
the agents’ kens across states, so heterogeneity holds.
It is interesting to note that the diﬃculty in fully characterising heterogeneity
only in terms of sets of states and accessibility relations can be seen as oﬀering
vindication to the approach adopted in this paper: The syntactic approach allows
us to avoid incoherences, and may allow us to consider models that a purely se-
mantic approach may not.
The upshot of our analysis is that if one is prepared to accept the assumptions for
the results in S5, then it is only a small step to also accept the results in KD45 -
without having to resort to anything as strong as the Zero-Priors assumption.
In contrast with S5, assuming that the language is very rich does not imply
that the agents have the same information at every state of every component.
However, it does nevertheless yield striking results.
Proposition 5. Suppose the language is very rich in some component ΩG(ω).
Then, condition (5.b) implies (1.b).
The implication of this proposition is that (5.b) together with a very rich
language imply heterogeneity. Therefore, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 6. Consider Ψr0 with r = 0, suppose DSTP holds, the agents are like-
minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states, condition (5.b) holds,
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the language is very rich, and the system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then,
|= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
5.2 Agreement without the Sure-Thing Principle
Here, we present here a theorem, similar to Theorem 3, which does not restrict
the decision functions to satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle. Firstly, reasonable
decision functions that violate the principle may arguably exist, and secondly,
such a theorem determines the conditions under which there is agreement even
when the principle is violated behaviourally (which is common, as surveyed in
Shafir (1994)).
Theorem 7. Suppose agents are like-minded and condition (1.b) hold, and the
system is KD45. Let G = {i, j} ⊆ N . Then, |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj )→ (x = y).
This result has several striking features: Firstly, it does not assume any-
thing about the decision functions, other than the requirement of like-mindedness.
Therefore, this theorem applies to all decision functions, including the ones that
do not satisfy the Sure-Thing Principle. Secondly, it makes no requirement on
the richness of the language. Thirdly, it does not require any restriction on r,
the modal depth of formulas. This means that decisions can be based on interac-
tive information. That is, formulas of the form: i believes that j believes that p.
Finally, it does not require decision functions to be independent of states, which
implies that the theorem holds even if the decision functions themselves are not
commonly believed.
Of course, the main driver here is condition (1.b), which states that it must be
commonly possible for the agents to have the same information. In S5, this condi-
tion has the same eﬀect as assuming a very rich language in S5; namely, it implies
that the agents have the same information at the same states in every compo-
nent. However, this implication does not hold in KD45, so unlike Theorem 3, the
agreement in Theorem 7 is not trivial.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1 (i) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω, and suppose that
ω |= ψ, for some formula ψ ∈ Ψr0. It must be the case that either (i.a) ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if
ωRiω￿ then ω￿ |= ψ, or (i.b) ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿ then ω￿ |= ¬ψ, or (i.c) ∃ω￿,ω￿￿ ∈ Ω,
such that ωRiω￿ and ωRiω￿￿, and ω￿ |= ψ and ω￿￿ |= ¬ψ (i.e. neither (i.a) nor (i.b)).
If (i.a) is the case, then ω |= ￿iψ. If (i.b) is the case, then ω |= ￿ˆiψ, and finally,
if (i.c) is the case, then ω |= ￿˙iψ. Therefore, in all cases, the operator over ψ
belongs to the set Oi, and since this holds for any ψ ∈ Ψr0, it holds for each entry
of a ken. Furthermore, |= can only generate consistent lists of formulas, so kens
cannot be inconsistent. This implies that a ken must exist that belongs to Vi.
(ii) Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and ω ∈ Ω. Let νi, µi ∈ Vi, and consider the nth
entry of each ken such that νni ψn ￿= µni ψn. Case (ii.a): Suppose ω |= νni ψn = ￿iψn.
So, ∀ω￿ ∈ Ω, if ωRiω￿, then ω￿ |= ψn. By definition, this rules out the possibility
that also, ω |= ￿ˆiψn, or ω |= ￿˙iψn. For cases (ii.b), ω |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn, and (ii.c),
ω |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn, proceed analogously to (ii.a).
Proof of Lemma 2 For ease of notation, let inf{νi, µi} = ηi.
(a) Suppose νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, if νi ￿ ηi and µi ￿ ηi, it must be
the case that ηni ψn = ￿iψn or ηni ψn = ￿˙iψn. However, if the latter, then ηi
would not be maximal in the set {ηi ∈ Vi|νi ￿ ηi and µi ￿ ηi}. Therefore,
ηni ψn = ￿iψn. Conversely, suppose ηni ψn = ￿iψn. Furthermore, suppose, without
loss of generality that µni ψn = ￿ˆiψn or µni ψn = ￿˙iψn. In the former case, ηi and
µi would not be comparable, and in the latter case, ηi would be more informative
than µi on that entry. Therefore, in either case, ηi would not belong to the set
{ηi ∈ Vi|νi ￿ ηi and µi ￿ ηi}. Therefore, νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿iψn. Proving cases
(b), ηni ψn = ￿ˆiψn iﬀ (νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿ˆiψn) and (c), ηni ψn = ￿˙iψn iﬀ (νni ψn ￿=
µni ψn or νni ψn = µni ψn = ￿˙iψn) can be done analogously to case (a).
Finally, suppose |= ηi ↔ (p ∧ ¬p). Then, there exist n and n￿ such that ηni ψn ↔
¬ηn￿i ψn￿ . But ηni is essentially generated by the conjunction of νni and µni . So, we
have (νni ψn∧µni ψn)↔ ¬(νn￿i ψn￿∧µn￿i ψn￿). But this implies that νni ψn ↔ ¬νn￿i ψn￿ or
µni ψn ↔ ¬µn￿i ψn￿ . That is, ηi is not in Vi if νi or µi are not in Vi. Therefore, ηi ∈ Vi.
Proof of Lemma 3 Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿) for some
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω￿Riω￿￿, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such that
ω￿ is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer, such
that ω￿￿ is reachable from ω. So, ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). (And, note that Ii(ω￿￿) ⊆ ΩG(ω)).
Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). Reflexivity guarantees that ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿￿). So, for some
ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω∗), so ω￿￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿).
Proof of Lemma 4 Suppose ω￿ |= νi for some ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω). Consider the nth
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entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Riω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. But since Ri is an equivalence relation, and
ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), it follows that Ii(ω￿) = Ii(ω). So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= ψn, from
which it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (b), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 5 Suppose that for all ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), M,ω￿ |= νi and for all
ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿), M,ω￿￿ |= µi. Consider the nth entry of each of these kens, which are
only defined for formulas in Ψ00.
Case (a): Suppose that νni pn = µni pn = ￿ipn, then for all ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿),
ω￿￿￿ |= pn, and therefore, for all ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω) ∪ Ii(ω￿), M(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)),ω￿￿￿ |=
inf{νi, µi}npn = ￿ipn.
Case (b), νni pn = µni ψn = ￿ˆipn, and (c) (νni pn ￿= µni pn or νni pn = µni pn = ￿˙ipn) are
treated analogously to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 6 By Lemma 1, for each ω￿ ∈ Ω, there is a ken that holds
at ω￿. That is, ω￿ |= ν(ω￿)i. By Lemma 4, we have that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿), ω￿￿ |=
ν(ω￿)i. Now, consider the set of kens {ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿)}. By Lemma
5, it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω￿), M({Ii(ω￿)|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}),ω￿￿ |=
inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿)}. By Lemma 3, for all ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω),M({Ii(ω￿)|ω￿ ∈
ΩG(ω)}),ω￿￿ |= inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, in the model in which i’s information
cell is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving j’s partition unchanged, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}
holds at every state in ΩG(ω). Reasoning similarly for agent j, in the model
in which j’s information cell is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving i’s partition unchanged,
inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω). However, since r = 0, an
agent i’s ken only depends on i’s accessibility relation (higher depth nested for-
mulas are ignored). So, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} and inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} hold
at every state ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) of a model M∗ in which all the set Ii(ω￿) are “merged”
and all the sets Ij(ω￿) are merged. But ∪ω￿∈ΩG(ω)Ii(ω￿) = ∪ω￿∈ΩG(ω)Ij(ω￿) = ΩG(ω).
That is, the agents have the same information cell inM∗. Trivially, it follows that
for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), M∗,ω￿ |= inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.
Proof of Theorem 1 Suppose r = 0, so Ψ00 = P ∗ and that NDSTP holds,
the agents are like-minded, the decision functions are invariant across all states,
and the system is S5. Arbitrarily choose ω ∈ Ω, and consider the set ΩG(ω).
Consider the sets of kens ν(ω)i ∈ Vi and ν(ω)j ∈ Vi, for all ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 1
part (i), we have that ω |= ν(ω)i ∧ ν(ω)j. Using the action function we have that
ω |= dDi(ν(ω)i)i ∧ dDj(ν(ω)j)j . Now, suppose that ω |= CG(dxi ∧ dyj ). By definition,
∀ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ |= dxi ∧ dyj . Therefore, notably, since ω ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that
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ω |= Di(ν(ω)i) = x ∧Dj(ν(ω)j) = y. It remains to show that ω |= (x = y).
Since the decision functions are the same across states, we can apply NDSTP to
obtain that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ |= Di(inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x.
Since ω ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that ω |= Di(inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x. By a similar
argument, one can show that ω |= Dj(inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = y.
By Lemma 6, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, by like-
mindedness, it follows that ω |= (x = y).
Proof of Theorem 2 Repeat the proof of Theorem 1, replacing Assumption
NDSTP with DSTP and the assumption that the language is rich in every com-
ponent.
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider an arbitrary ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), and suppose
ω￿ |= ￿iψn. Then ω￿ |= ψn by reflexivity of Ri. But by reflexivity of Rj at ω￿, this
implies that ω￿ |= ￿jψn ∧ ￿˙jψn. But if the language is very rich, the only possible
case is ω￿ |= ￿jψn.
Proof of Proposition 2 Let “i-arrow” refer to an arrow of i’s accessibility
relation. Firstly, we can show that Ri = Ei ∪ Fi. An arbitrary ω ∈ Ω either has
an i-arrow pointing to it or it does not. If it does not, by seriality, it points to
another state. If it does, then there exists a state ω￿ that points to ω which itself
points to some state ω￿￿ by seriality. Transitivity implies that ω￿ points to ω￿￿ and
Euclideaness implies that ω￿￿ points to ω. From here it is easy to prove that ω, ω￿
and ω￿￿ are in an equivalence class.
Secondly, we show that if Ji(ω￿) ￿= Ji(ω￿￿) then Ji(ω￿) ∩ Ji(ω￿￿) = ∅. Suppose
ω ∈ Ji(ω￿) ∩ Ji(ω￿￿). If ω ∈ Si(ω￿) ∩ Si(ω￿￿) then Si(ω￿) and Si(ω￿￿) are indis-
tinguishable, and one can verify that Ji(ω￿) = Ji(ω￿￿). If ω ∈ Si(ω￿) ∩ Ai(ω￿￿)
then ω both does have and does not have an i-arrow pointing to it. Finally, if
ω ∈ Ai(ω￿) ∩ Ai(ω￿￿) then by Euclideaness, ω￿ and ω￿￿ are indistinguishable, and
Ji(ω￿) = Ji(ω￿￿).
Thirdly, we can show that ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω) = Ω. Suppose ω￿ ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω), then by the
definitions of Si and Ai, ω￿ ∈ Ω. On the other hand, suppose ω ∈ Ω. Then if there
is an i-arrow pointing to ω, ω ∈ Si(ω) ⊆ Ji(ω). If there is no i-arrow pointing to
it, then by seriality, there is an ω￿ that ω points to, so ω ∈ Ai(ω￿) ⊆ Ji(ω￿). So,
ω ∈ ∪ω∈ΩJi(ω).
Proof of Lemma 7 Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Si(ω￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿) for some
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). But, ω￿Eiω￿￿, and there exists a sequence of Ri (i ∈ G) steps such
that ω￿ is reachable from ω. Therefore, there exists a sequence, one step longer,
such that ω￿￿ is reachable from ω. So, ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω).
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Suppose ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω). Either ω￿￿ has an i-arrow pointing towards it, in which
case ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿). So, ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿) ∪ Ai(ω￿￿) = Ji(ω￿￿), or, ω￿￿ has no i-arrow
pointing towards it, in which case, by seriality, there exists some ω￿￿￿ such that
ω￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω￿￿￿). Note that ω￿￿￿ must be in ΩG(ω) since it is reachable from ω￿￿. So,
ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿￿)∪Ai(ω￿￿￿) = Ji(ω￿￿￿). In either case, for some ω∗ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω∗),
so ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω￿).
Proof of Lemma 8 Suppose ω￿ |= νi for some ω￿ ∈ Ji(ω). Firstly, suppose
ω￿ ∈ Si(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(a) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Eiω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. But since Ei is an equivalence relation, and
ω￿ ∈ Si(ω), it follows that Si(ω￿) = Si(ω). So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω), ω￿￿ |= ψn, from
which it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn. Also, each ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω) has an
arrow pointing to each state in Si(ω), so for all ω∗ ∈ Si(ω), if ω￿￿￿Fiω∗, ω∗ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω), ω￿￿￿ |= ￿iψn. It follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω), ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (b), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case
(a).
Now, suppose ω￿ ∈ Ai(ω), and consider the nth entry of the ken, namely, νni ψn.
(d) Suppose ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ω, ω￿Fiω￿￿ implies ω￿￿ |= ψn.
So, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. This implies that ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω),
and ω￿￿￿ |= ￿iψn for all other states ω￿￿￿ ∈ Ai(ω). It follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω),
ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn.
Case (e), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (f), ω￿ |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn are analogous to case (d).
Proof of Lemma 9 Suppose that for all ω ∈ Ji(ω), M,ω |= νi and for all
ω￿ ∈ Ji(ω￿), M,ω￿ |= µi. Consider the nth entry of each of these kens, defined only
for formulas in Ψ00.
Case (a): Suppose that νni pn = µni pn = ￿ipn, then for all ω￿￿ ∈ Si(ω) ∪ Si(ω￿),
ω￿￿ |= pn, and therefore, following the proof of Lemma 8, for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω)∪Ji(ω￿),
M(Ji(ω), Ji(ω￿)),ω￿￿ |= inf{νi, µi}npn = ￿ipn.
Case (b), νni pn = µni ψn = ￿ˆipn, and (c) (νni pn ￿= µni pn or νni pn = µni pn = ￿˙ipn) are
treated analogously to case (a).
Proof of Lemma 10 By Lemma 1, for each ω￿ ∈ Ω, there is a ken that holds
at ω￿. That is, ω￿ |= ν(ω￿)i. By Lemma 8, we have that for all ω￿￿ ∈ Ji(ω￿), ω￿￿ |=
ν(ω￿)i. Now, consider the set of kens {ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿)}. By Lemma
9, it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ￿ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω￿), M({Ji(ω￿)|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}),ω￿￿ |=
inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿)}.
By Lemma 7, since ΩG(ω) ⊆
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿), it follows that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), we
have that M({Ji(ω￿)|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}),ω￿￿ |= inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿)}. Fur-
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thermore, the kens that hold in states (
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿))\ΩG(ω) must be identical
to the ones that hold at the states in ΩG(ω), because all the states in the former
set must be associated states, and thus the information that holds at them must be
the same as the information that holds true in their respective information sinks,
which are contained in ΩG(ω). Therefore, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ji(ω
￿)} =
inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. It follows therefore, that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), we have that
M({Ji(ω￿)|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}),ω￿￿ |= inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, in the model in which
i’s information sink plus associated states is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving j’s accessi-
bility relation unchanged, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω).
Reasoning similarly for agent j, in the model in which j’s information sink plus
associated states is equal to ΩG(ω), leaving i’s accessibility relation unchanged,
inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} holds at every state in ΩG(ω).20
Now, since r = 0, an agent i’s ken only depends on i’s accessibility relation (higher
depth nested formulas are ignored). So, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} and inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈
ΩG(ω)} hold at every state ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) of a modelM∗ in which all the set Si(ω￿) are
“merged” and all the sets Sj(ω￿) are merged. Now, by heterogeneity, it follows that
for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), M∗,ω￿ |= inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}.21
Proof of Theorem 4 Suppose we restrict ourselves to Ψ00 and that NDSTP
holds, the agents are like-minded, the decision functions are invariant across all
states, heterogeneity holds, and the system is KD45. Arbitrarily choose ω ∈ Ω,
and consider the set ΩG(ω). Consider the sets of kens ν(ω)i ∈ Vi and ν(ω)j ∈ Vi,
for all ω ∈ Ω. By Lemma 1 part (i), we have that ω |= ν(ω)i ∧ ν(ω)j. And, by the
action function, we have that ω |= dDi(ν(ω)i)i ∧ dDj(ν(ω)j)j . Now, suppose that ω |=
CG(dxi ∧ dyj ). By definition, ∀ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ |= dxi ∧ dyj . Therefore, ∀ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω),
ω￿￿ |= Di(ν(ω￿￿)i) = x∧Dj(ν(ω￿￿)j) = y. By Lemma 8, the kens are uniform across
the sets J , and furthermore, the decision functions are invariant across state, so
even if ω ￿∈ ΩG(ω), we must have ω |= Di(ν(ω)i) = x ∧Dj(ν(ω)j) = y. It remains
to show that ω |= (x = y).
Since the decision functions are the same across states, we can apply Assumption
NDSTP to obtain that for all ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿￿ |= Di(inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = x.
By a similar argument, one can show that ω |= Dj(inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}) = y.
By Lemma 10, inf{ν(ω￿)i|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)} ∼ inf{ν(ω￿)j|ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω)}. So, by like-
mindedness, it follows that ω |= (x = y).
20Note that the set ΩG(ω) does not change as a result of the sink merge operation: No state
in ΩG(ω) becomes connected to a state outside the set, and states within the set can only gain
connections, never lose any.
21We require heterogeneity since there is no guarantee that ∪ω￿∈ΩG(ω)Si(ω￿) =
∪ω￿∈ΩG(ω)Sj(ω￿), and an agent i’s ken essentially depends only on the sets Si.
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Proof of Theorem 5 Repeat proof of Theorem 4, replacing NDSTP with
DSTP and the assumption that the language is rich in every component.
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose that for every ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)i.
Consider the nth entry of the kens.
Case (a): Suppose that ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = ￿iψn. Then, for all
ω￿￿ ∈ Ii(ω￿), ω￿￿ |= ψn. But, by Lemma 3, since
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ii(ω
￿) = ΩG(ω), it follows
that for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ψn.
Furthermore, by Lemma 3,
￿
ω￿∈ΩG(ω) Ij(ω
￿) = ΩG(ω). Therefore, no matter what
information cell j might be in, ψn will be true at each state in that information
cell. Therefore ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ￿jψn. That is, the nth entry of the kens carry
the same information.
Case (b): ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = ￿ˆiψn is treated analogously to case (a).
Case (c): Suppose that ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)ni ψn = ￿˙iψn. Then, there exists
ω￿￿ and ω￿￿￿ with ω￿Riω￿￿ and ω￿Riω￿￿￿, such that ω￿￿ |= ψn and ω￿￿￿ |= ¬ψn. It fol-
lows that there exists ω￿￿,ω￿￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that ω￿￿ |= ψn and ω￿￿￿ |= ¬ψn. Now,
suppose that for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)njψn = ￿jψn or that for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω),
ω￿ |= ν(ω)njψn = ￿ˆjψn. If for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ￿jψn, then (as above) for all
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ψn, which contradicts the fact that ω￿￿￿ |= ¬ψn. Similarly, if for
all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ￿ˆjψn, then (as above) for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ¬ψn, which
contradicts the fact that ω￿￿ |= ψn. Therefore, ∀ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ￿˙jψn.
Since the above cases exhaust every possibility of an entry in a ken, and since the
entry was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= ν(ω)i ∼ ν(ω)j.
Proof of Proposition 4 The implications among the conditions expressed
semantically are simple.
Now, we can show that for any ω ∈ Ω such that Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω), if ω |= νi∧ νj then
ω |= νi ￿ νj; which would establish the semantic to syntactic implications for con-
ditions 1 and 2. Consider some arbitrary state ω ∈ Ω. Suppose Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω) and
ω |= νi ∧ νj. Consider the nth entry of these kens. (a) Suppose ω |= νni ψn = ￿iψn,
and suppose that ω |= νnj ψn = ￿ˆjψn. Then, ∀ω￿ ∈ Sj(ω), ω￿ |= ¬ψn. But if
Si(ω) ⊆ Sj(ω), then ∀ω￿ ∈ Si(ω), ω￿ |= ¬ψn, which contradicts the statement
that ω |= ￿iψn. Therefore, ω |= (νnj ψn = ￿jψn ∨ νnj ψn = ￿˙jψn). Cases (b),
ω |= νni ψn = ￿ˆiψn and (c) ω |= νni ψn = ￿˙iψn can dealt with analogously to case
(a).
Now we can show that (3.a) implies (3.b): By the definition of (3.a), there is a
state ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that every state reachable from ω￿ is reflexive in both Ri
and Rj. So, at each one of those states, ￿iψn → ψn for all formulas and all agents.
We can show that (4.a) implies (4.b): Suppose that (4.a) holds, but not (4.b).
So let ω￿ |= ν(ω)i ∧ µ(ω)j for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), and yet, ν(ω)i is diﬀerent from
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µ(ω)j. Case (a): At ω￿ ∈ Si(ω￿), for some ψn, we have ω￿ |= ￿iψn ∧ ￿ˆjψn. But if
Si(ω￿) ⊆ Sj(ω￿￿) for some ω￿￿, then ω￿￿ |= ψn, in which case we cannot have ￿ˆjψn
at every state in the component. Case (b): At ω￿ ∈ Sj(ω￿), for some ψn, we have
ω￿ |= ￿iψn ∧ ￿˙jψn. But if Sj(ω￿) ⊆ Si(ω￿￿) for some ω￿￿, then ω￿￿￿ |= ¬ψn for some
ω￿￿￿ ∈ Si(ω￿￿), in which case we cannot have ￿iψn at every state in the component.
All other cases are trivial, or resemble one of the above.
We can show that (5.a) implies (5.b): Suppose ω￿ ∈ Si(ω￿) ∩ Sj(ω￿). Suppose that
for some ψn, ω |= ￿iψn. By reflexivity of Ri, ω |= ψn. Now, suppose ω |= ￿ˆjψn.
By reflexivity of Rj at ω￿, ω￿ |= ¬ψn, a contradiction.
Finally, that (1.b) implies (2.b) implies (4.b) is trivial. Also, that (1.b) implies
(3.b) is trivial.
We can show that (3.b) implies (4.b): Suppose (3.b) holds and that (4.b) does
not hold. (3.b) implies that there is a state ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that every state
reachable from ω￿ is reflexive in both Ri and Rj. Suppose ω￿ |= ν(ω)i ∧ µ(ω)j
for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), and yet, ν(ω)i is diﬀerent from µ(ω)j. Let ω￿￿ be reachable
from ω￿. Case (a): suppose that at ω￿￿, for some ψn, we have ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn ∧ ￿ˆjψn.
By reflexivity of both Ri and Rj, ω￿￿ |= ψn ∧ ¬ψn, a contradiction. Case (b):
ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn∧ ￿˙jψn. Then, for some reachable ω￿￿￿, ω￿￿￿ |= ¬ψn. Since Ri is reflexive
at ω￿￿￿, it cannot be the case that ω￿￿￿ |= ￿iψn, thus contradicting the assumption
that i’s ken is the same across each state in the component.
Finally, we can show that (3.b) implies (5.b): (3.b), implies that there is a state
ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that every state reachable from ω￿ is reflexive in both Ri and
Rj. Let ω￿￿ be reachable from ω￿. Suppose that at ω￿￿, for some ψn, we have
ω￿￿ |= ￿iψn ∧ ￿ˆjψn. By reflexivity of both Ri and Rj, ω￿￿ |= ψn ∧ ¬ψn, a contra-
diction.
Proof of Proposition 5 Suppose that there exists ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that for
all n ∈ {1, ...,m}, ω￿ |= ¬(￿iψn ∧ ￿ˆjψn). So, suppose ω |= ￿iψn. This implies
that ω￿ |= ￿˙jψn ∨￿jψn. But since the language is very rich, we are only left with
ω￿ |= ￿jψn. This is true for all propositions. Therefore, if (5.b) holds, then there
is a state in which the agents have the same ken. That is, condition (1.b) holds.
Proof of Theorem 7 Suppose that there is some ω ∈ Ω such that ω |=
CG(dxi ∧ dyj ) ∧ (x ￿= y). Then, for all ω￿ ∈ ΩG(ω), ω￿ |= Di(ν(ω￿)i) = x ￿= y =
Dj(µ(ω￿)j). By like-mindedness, it follows that ω￿ |= ¬(ν(ω￿)i ∼ µ(ω￿)j). But
this contradicts (1.b). Namely, that there exists a state ω￿￿ ∈ ΩG(ω) such that
ω￿￿ |= ν(ω￿￿)i ∼ µ(ω￿￿)j.
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Appendix B
Map to Bacharach (1985)
Note that by Lemma 4, if Di(ν(ω)i) for some ω ∈ Ω, then for all ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω),
Di(ν(ω￿)i) = Di(ν(ω)i). So, for each agent i ∈ N , we can define a function
Hi : 2Ω → A, where Hi(Ii(ω)) = Di(ν(ω)i). Furthermore, we can define another
function hi : Ω → A such that for all ω￿ ∈ Ii(ω), hi(ω￿) = Hi(Ii(ω)). This thus
defines a map from our decision functions into Bacharach’s framework.
Finally, we can also define Bacharach’s Sure-Thing Principle: If Hi(Ii(ω)) =
Hi(Ii(ω￿)) and clearly Ii(ω) ∩ Ii(ω￿) = ∅, then Hi(m(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿))) = Hi(Ii(ω)).
Now, m(Ii(ω), Ii(ω￿)), in Bacharach (1985) would simply be equal to Ii(ω)∪Ii(ω￿).
Map to Aumann & Hart (2006)
Aumann and Hart (2006) derive their agreement theorem using the framework
developed in Aumann (1999) for the analysis of interactive knowledge in a parti-
tional state space. Essentially, restricting ourselves to Ψ00, we can define a mapping
νi ￿→ e ∈ P ∗, where,
e :=
￿
x∈{pn|νni pn=￿ipn}
x ∧
￿
y∈{¬pn|νni pn=￿ˆipn}
y
That is, e is the conjunction of all the propositions (or their negation) that i knows,
and all the propositions pn for which νni pn = ￿˙ipn are ignored.
Given this, if we have ν(ω)i, then e is the “minimal” formula that i knows at ω,
in the sense that if ￿ie￿ then e→ e￿. Note furthermore, that given our “richness”
assumption on Ψ00, we have that if e ￿= e￿ then ¬(e∧e￿), and if νi ￿→ e￿ and µi ￿→ e￿￿,
then inf{νi, µi} ￿→ (e￿ ∨ e￿￿). Given this map, our decision functions Di : Vi → A
become Hi : P ∗ → A.
The Disjoint Sure-Thing Principle now becomes,
|=
￿
i∈N
￿
e,e￿∈P ∗
[Hi(e) = Hi(e
￿) ∧ ¬(e ∧ e￿)→ Hi(e ∨ e￿) = Hi(e)]
which is the formulation given in Aumann and Hart (2006).
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